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Abstract 
This article, accepted for publication in the 2012 Polish Yearbook of International Law, argues that – 
in order to make international economic law (IEL) a more effective instrument for protecting human 
rights and other public goods – citizens and courts of justice must insist on interpreting and developing 
IEL ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and human rights, as required by the customary methods 
of treaty interpretation (I). By empowering citizens through legal and judicial remedies, cosmopolitan 
rights can strengthen the legal and democratic accountability of governments for their ‘duties to 
protect’ public goods (II). The ‘dual nature’ of modern legal systems resulting from their incorporation 
of ‘inalienable’ human rights requires justifying IEL in terms of ‘normative individualism’ and 
reasonable interests of all citizens (III). Human rights and democratic constitutionalism entail not only 
changes of the ‘rules of recognition’ (IV) and require ‘judicial balancing’ as the ‘ultimate rule of law’ 
(V). They also protect individual and democratic diversity and ‘reasonable disagreement’ (VI). The 
article discusses ten areas of increasing synergies between IEL and human rights law (VII- IX). 
Arguably, the normative proposition of justifying and designing IEL in terms of constitutional 
principles of justice and cosmopolitan rights is confirmed by the empirical fact that cosmopolitan legal 
systems (e.g. in European commercial, trade, investment and human rights law) tend to realize their 
declared objectives more effectively than state-centred ‘Westphalian legal regimes’ (X-XII). 
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
NEED FOR STRONGER ‘DEMOCRATIC OWNERSHIP’ AND COSMOPOLITAN REFORMS 
 
Prof. Dr. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann* 
 
Law and governance need justification. Modern theories of justice (e.g. by J.Rawls) proceed from the 
economic insight that the social welfare of a community depends on its democratic responsibility and 
political capability of institutionalizing reasonable rules and just institutions enabling citizens to 
increase their individual welfare through rules-based social cooperation and division of labour. As the 
potential economic benefits of division of labour depend on the scope of the market and on ‘human 
capital’ rather than on natural resources, even poor countries with few natural resources (like 
Switzerland in the 19th century) have succeeded in becoming rich by integrating into the worldwide 
division of labour, liberalizing welfare-reducing border discrimination, and protecting constitutional 
rights and rule of law at home and in transnational cooperation across frontiers. International 
agreements constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying international institutions for mutually 
beneficial governance of interrelated, national and international public goods (like efficient monetary, 
trading, financial and related rule-of-law systems) can serve ‘constitutional functions’ for protecting 
producers, investors, traders, consumers and other citizens engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation 
across frontiers against welfare-reducing border discrimination and other harmful abuses of 
discretionary foreign policy powers.1 But the increasing transformation of national into international 
public goods with ‘horizontal’ as well as ‘vertical interdependencies’ (e.g. among national and 
international markets for goods, services, persons and capital movements) also entails new private and 
public powers (e.g. of private actors in global financial markets, international organizations) that risk 
being abused in the absence of adequate constitutional and democratic restraints, as illustrated by the 
under-regulation of international financial markets, the financial crises since 2008, the lack of 
effective parliamentary, judicial and democratic control over intergovernmental rule-making in 
worldwide organizations, as well as by domestic non-compliance with many internationally agreed 
disciplines (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty’s budget and debt disciplines and their persistent violation in most 
of the 17 Eurozone member countries).2 
Ten years ago, I published a series of articles calling for ‘mainstreaming human rights into the law of 
worldwide organizations’ in order to strengthen the ‘constitutional functions’ of international 
economic law (IEL) to contribute to reducing the unnecessary poverty of more than 1 billion people 
living on 1$ or less per day and to protecting, respecting and fulfilling human rights of citizens.3 Law - 
in contrast to the natural sciences - is not about discovering ‘scientific truth out there’, but rather about 
‘institutionalizing public reason’ (J.Rawls) enabling individuals to peacefully cooperate in order to 
realize their individual and democratic self-development. Hence, my articles argued that - from a 
human rights perspective recognizing human dignity, reasonableness, autonomy (including ‘human 
capacities’) and human rights of citizens to justification of all governance restrictions - both IEL and 
                                                     
*
 Emeritus Professor of International and European Law and former head of the Law Department, European 
University Institute, Florence (Italy). Former secretary, member or chairman of numerous GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement panels; former German representative in UN, OECD and EU institutions; and former legal 
counsel/consultant for GATT, the WTO, UNCTAD, the OECD, the EU Commission and the European 
Parliament. This paper has been accepted for publication in the Polish Yearbook of International Law 2012. 
1
 E.U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law 
(Fribourg: Fribourg University Press and Boulder Press, 1991). 
2
  On the ‘collective action problems’ of interdependent public goods see : E.U.Petersmann (ed), Multilevel 
Governance of Interdependent Public Goods. Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy 
Challenge in the 21st Century (EUI Global Governance Program Working Paper 2012). 
3
 Cf. E.U. Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact‘ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law 
of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, in: EJIL 13 (2002) 621-650. 
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human rights law (HRL) can be seen as instruments to realize the human rights to self-development. 
Without stronger ‘democratic ownership’ and cosmopolitan rights empowering citizens to rely on 
transnational rule of law, IEL cannot effectively fulfil its ‘constitutional functions’ to empower and 
protect domestic citizens benefitting from the worldwide division of labour. Yet, as human rights say 
little about the optimal constitutional, legislative, administrative, international and judicial design of 
economic regulation and constitutional traditions legitimately differ among states, comparative 
analyses of national and international economic regulation are of crucial importance – albeit often 
neglected outside Europe - for evaluating the relative efficiency and legitimacy of IEL. 
The two constitutional principles underlying my proposition – i.e. (1) the customary law requirement 
of interpreting international treaties ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and the human rights 
obligations of all UN member states, as explicitly codified in the Preamble of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); and (2) the need for a ‘4-stage-sequence’ of 
constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial ‘institutionalization of public reason’4 in order to 
protect human rights effectively – had been presented by myself in numerous conferences in Europe 
since the 1980s without causing much controversy in view of the successful ‘merger’ of human rights 
law, economic law and constitutional law in European international law.5 Hence, the violent rejection 
of my proposal in 2002 by a few Anglo-Saxon lawyers (like P.Alston and R.Howse) – arguing for 
keeping HRL and IEL separate in view of the lack of human rights expertise of economic 
organizations, and rejecting ‘judicial balancing’ of human, economic and social rights as practised by 
courts throughout Europe - took me by surprise.6 Till today, proposals from Anglo-Saxon countries for 
responding to the increasing crises in IEL (e.g. for ‘fighting the private and public debt crises’ by 
additional ‘monetary financing’ from the European Central Bank) are often based on value-premises 
(like majoritarian conceptions of democracy in terms of ‘parliamentary freedom’, laissez-faire 
conceptions of private self-regulation and ‘common law freedoms’) that differ fundamentally from 
those of constitutional democracies prioritizing the constitutional rights of citizens and the 
constitutional limits of majority politics also in economic regulation. Understanding this impact of 
diverse national conceptions of constitutional democracy, majoritarian democracy, non-liberal 
democracy and authoritarian governance systems on intergovernmental rule-making and adjudication 
is often crucial for understanding the ‘collective action problems’ impeding effective protection of 
international public goods. The purpose of this article is two-fold:  
• Sections I to X identify and discuss 10 areas of IEL where the ‘trade and human rights linkages’ 
have become increasingly recognized over the past ten years. 
• Sections XI and XII ask whether the dynamic evolution of international investment law (XI) and 
of the European monetary union (XII) over the past years offer lessons for constitutional and 
cosmopolitan reforms of IEL. The article concludes that ‘cosmopolitan international public 
goods’ – like citizen-driven trading, financial, development, environmental and related rule-of-
law systems aimed at protecting consumer welfare – require stronger legal and judicial 
protection of cosmopolitan and democratic rights in order to limit the ubiquity of ‘market 
failures’, ‘governance failures’ and related abuses of public and private power. 
                                                     
4
 On the ‘four-stage sequence’ of legitimate rulemaking inside constitutional democracies like the USA see: J. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), at 195 ff. 
5 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Constitutional Functions of Public International Economic Law, in: V. Van Themaat (ed), 
Restructuring the International Economic Order. The Role of Law and Lawyers (Colloquium on the occasion 
of the 350th anniversary of the University of Utrecht: The Hague, Kluwer, 1987), 49 – 75; idem, Trade Po-
licy as a Constitutional Problem. On the 'Domestic Policy Functions' of International Trade Rules, in: 
Aussenwirtschaft 41 (1986), 405-439; idem, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in: 
M.Hilf/E.U.Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 
1993), 3-52. 
6
 E.U.Petersmann, Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder 
to Alston, in: EJIL 13 (2002) 845-851. 
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I.  Respect for the Customary Methods of International Treaty Interpretation 
Promoting Synergies of HRL and IEL 
Article 1 of the UN Charter, the customary methods of treaty interpretation as codified in the VCLT, 
and the statutes and procedures of ‘courts of justice’ require that – as stated in the Preamble of the 
VCLT - ‘disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, should be settled by peaceful 
means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’. The Preamble of the 
VCLT refers, inter alia, to 
‘principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, such as the 
principles of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, of the sovereign equality and 
independence of States, of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all’.7 
Arguably, the same principle of ‘constitutional interpretation’ of international treaties also follows 
from the customary rule codified in Article 31:3 VCLT, which requires taking into account - in the 
interpretation of treaties - ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.’ All UN member states have obligations under the UN Charter, UN human rights 
conventions and under general international law to respect and protect human rights with due regard to 
‘sovereign equality of states’; many UN and regional conventions also explicitly require compliance 
with ‘principles of justice’. Yet, there are hardly any legal analyses so far of the role of ‘principles of 
justice’ for dispute prevention and dispute settlement in IEL and in multilevel economic adjudication.8 
As the positive law requirements of ‘constitutional interpretation’ and dispute settlement ‘in 
conformity with principles of justice’ tend to be neglected in many bilateral, regional and worldwide 
procedures for the settlement of economic disputes, exploring the legal and contextual relevance of 
HRL for interpreting IEL remains of constitutional importance for protecting human rights and 
consumer welfare.  
Over the past ten years, the need for promoting synergies between human rights and trade by 
interpreting IEL in conformity with human rights has been recognized by ever more international 
economic organizations (e.g. in speeches by WTO Director-General P. Lamy) and courts as well as by 
ever more non-governmental organizations, including also the International Law Association at its 
2008 Conference at Toronto.9 The ‘judicial balancing’ of human and economic rights in all European 
courts is now also cited and emulated in regional economic courts outside Europe.10 And even 
investor-state arbitral tribunals acknowledge the need for interpreting IEL in conformity with human 
rights.11 UN human rights bodies admit ever more the need for strengthening human rights in IEL, as 
                                                     
7
 Arguably, this Preamble text refers not only to the preceding sub-paragraph on ‘conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties can be maintained’; it also refers to ‘principles of justice 
and international law’, in conformity with the recognition in numerous legal systems that human rights 
constitute not only individual rights, but also corresponding obligations of governments and ‘principles of 
law’ to be taken into account in legislation, administration, adjudication and international treaty interpretation 
pursuant to Article 31 VCLT. 
8
 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Administration of Justice in the WTO: Did the WTO Appellate Body Commit ‘Grave 
Injustice’? in: The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009) 329-373.   
9
 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, International Trade Law, Human Rights and the Customary International Law Rules on 
Treaty Interpretation, in:  S.Joseph/D.Kinley/ J.Waincymer (eds), The WTO and Human Rights (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2009), 69-90. 
10
 See, e.g., the MERCOSUR arbitral award of 6 September 2006 in the ‘Bridges case’ between Argentina and 
Uruguay (cf. L.Lixinski, Human Rights in MERCOSUR, in : M.T.F.Filho/L.Lixinski/ M.B.O.Giupponi (eds), 
The Law of MERCOSUR (Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2010), at 351 ff.  
11
 See, e.g., the UNCITRAL Arbitral Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010 in AWG v Argentina (i.e. one of the 
more than 40 arbitration proceedings against Argentina’s restrictions in response to its financial crisis in 
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illustrated by the UN Human Rights Council’s endorsement on 16 June 2011 of the ‘Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework’ proposed by the UN Special Representative J. Ruggie12, or by the ‘Human Rights Impact 
Assessments for Trade and Investment Agreements’ elaborated by the UN Special Rapporteur for the 
Right to Food in cooperation with UN bodies and NGOs.13 UN human rights bodies increasingly 
recognize the crucial role of trade and IEL for poverty reduction; they no longer discredit the WTO, as 
in a report for the UN Commission on Human Rights of 2001, as ‘a veritable nightmare’ for 
developing countries and women.14 The acknowledgment - in the practices of ever more UN 
Specialized Agencies (like the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization) and more recently also of the WTO - of 
connections between human rights (e.g. of access to food and essential medicines, rights to private 
property, human rights of access to justice and to rule of law) and development is likely to enhance the 
legitimacy not only of promoting international public goods through international institutions; also 
human rights law may benefit from the discourse among economic institutions and, e.g., UN human 
rights rapporteurs requesting international organizations to 'respect, protect and fulfil' human rights 
and adjust economic rules (e.g. WTO rules on liberalization of agricultural trade).15 ‘Westphalian 
interpretations’ of UN HRL and IEL, i.e. the traditionally one-sided focus on rights and obligations of 
states without acknowledgment of citizens as ‘primary subjects’ and sources of legitimacy also in 
international law, are increasingly challenged (e.g. by civil society, human rights courts and economic 
courts) by invoking human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ as justifications and ‘relevant 
context’ for ‘cosmopolitan interpretations' of certain international law rules for the benefit of citizens. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
2001), at para. 262: ‘In the circumstances of these cases, Argentina’s human rights obligations and its 
investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive’. 
12
 Cf. UN document A/HRC/RES/17/4 of 6 July 2011. 
13
 O. de Schutter, Draft Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements (1 July 2011), accessible under http://www.srfood.org.  
14
 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, ECOSOC document 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/12 of 15 June 2000, at paragraph 15. Apart from a reference to patents and their possibly 
adverse effects on pharmaceutical prices (depending on the competition, patent and social laws of the 
countries concerned), the report nowhere identifies conflicts between WTO rules and human rights.  
15
 Cf. the 2011 report by O. de Schutter, UN Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
on The WTO and the Post-Global Food Crisis Agenda: Putting Food Security First in the International Food 
System (published on the website of the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights) and the 
criticism of its protectionist recommendations in an open letter by WTO Director-General P.Lamy posted on 
the WTO website on 14 December 2011 (referring also to written comments by the WTO Secretariat on an 
earlier draft of the report). 
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II.  Increasing Recognition of ‘Cosmopolitan Rights’ making ‘Duties to Protect’ 
More Effective in HRL and IEL 
The customary law requirement of interpreting international treaties ‘in conformity with principles of 
justice’ and with the human rights obligations of states reflects a broader constitutional insight as 
emphasized by J.Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ and modern economics: The welfare of citizens and their 
adequate access to essential goods and services depend on ‘reasonable rules and institutions’ rather 
than on domestic economic resources; countries rich in economic resources (like Nigeria) often fail to 
protect the welfare of their citizens. Hence, the World Development Report 2011 rightly identifies the 
‘absence of legitimate institutions that provide citizens security, justice and jobs’ as the main cause of 
mass violence and unnecessary poverty in so many countries. If protection and fulfilment of human 
rights depends on ‘responsible sovereignty’, then cosmopolitan rights are a precondition for 
empowering citizens to govern themselves (e.g. by engaging in mutually beneficial trade) and ensure 
the accountability of all delegated governance powers. Constitutional democracies and European 
international law recognize that the legal task of ‘institutionalizing public reason’ depends – also in 
IEL - on a ‘four-stage sequence’ of constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial safeguards of 
human rights with due respect for ‘reasonable disagreement’ about particular conceptions for a good 
life.16 Civil society increasingly challenges the obvious failures of both UN HRL and worldwide IEL – 
which are confronted with ever more crises in international monetary, trade, financial, environmental 
relations and poverty reduction – to institutionalize ‘public reason’ in international relations. 
‘Westphalian intergovernmentalism’ reflects ‘discourse failures’ due to authoritarian treatment of 
citizens as mere objects of international law and neglect of human rights to reasonable justification of 
all governance restrictions. My publications have argued long since that the common ‘constitutional 
problem’ of the crises in HRL and IEL is that regulatory discretion and ‘rent-seeking’ by powerful 
interest groups are inadequately ‘constitutionally constrained’ by constitutional rights, institutional 
‘checks and balances’ (e.g. judicial remedies) and democratic ‘public reason’.  
 IEL and international HRL evolved as separate regimes until their successful ‘merger’ in European 
international law. In contrast to the hierarchical nature of domestic constitutional systems, UN HRL 
remains essentially a horizontal legal system respecting sovereign rights to apply higher standards of 
national and regional HRL compared with UN HRL. This respect for legitimate ‘constitutional 
pluralism’ entails that the content, legal protection and ‘balancing’ of civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural human rights, and their contextual relevance for IEL, often remain contested. The 
unnecessary poverty and inadequate access to water, food, health protection, education and rule of law 
of 1-2 billion people illustrate that neither UN HRL nor worldwide IEL treaties have succeeded in 
realizing the declared objective of states ‘that human rights should be protected by the rule of law’ so 
as to promote ‘universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ 
(Preamble of the 1948 UDHR). Human rights do not enforce themselves; as the lack of any references 
to human rights in the IMF, World Bank, GATT and WTO agreements impedes protection of human 
rights in IEL, ‘mainstreaming human rights’ into IEL remains the central challenge of HRL and IEL in 
the 21st century. Arguably, the increasing legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights 
empowering citizens to challenge welfare-reducing abuses of public and private power by invoking 
‘access to justice’ and other human rights, trading rights, investor rights, intellectual property rights, 
environmental, labour and social rights and corresponding obligations of governments is among the 
most important changes in IEL over the past years. 
                                                     
16
 See note 4 above.  
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III. Acknowledgment of the ‘Dual’ and ‘Incomplete Nature’ of HRL and of the 
‘Cosmopolitan Functions’ also of IEL 
Many national constitutions, regional human rights conventions and all UN human rights instruments 
derive human rights from respect for the human dignity of all human beings who – as stated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - 'are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood' (Article 1 UDHR).  Since 1945, all UN member states 
have regularly reaffirmed their ‘commitment towards the full realization of all human rights for all, 
which are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing.’17 The 
statement in the Preamble of the UDHR  - ‘it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have 
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law’ – confirms the moral justification of the entitlement of every individual to 
'inalienable' human rights’ and to ‘struggles for rights’, as illustrated by the Arab human rights 
revolutions in North Africa in 2011 and by increasing civil society calls for better protection of human 
rights (like access to essential food, medicines and health services) in IEL so as to fulfil everyone’s 
rights to ‘a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
can be fully realized’ (Article 28 UDHR). Today, the ‘dual nature’ of human rights as moral rights 
and integral parts of positive national and international law is universally recognized by all 193 UN 
member states and prompts citizens, some governments and courts to increasingly insist on stronger 
protection of human rights.18 
The 1966 UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) focuses on ‘the right to 
work’ (Article 6), the ‘right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work’ 
(Article 7), labour rights and trade union rights (Article 8), the ‘right of everybody to social security’ 
(Article 9), protection of the family, mothers and children (Article 10), the ’right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living’ (Article 11), and the human rights to health (Article 12) and to education 
(Article 13). Yet, apart from a brief reference to ‘safeguarding fundamental political and economic 
freedoms to the individual’ (Article 6.2), the ICESCR does not refer to the economic freedoms of 
profession, trade and private property which are recognized as fundamental rights in many European 
constitutions, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and in its EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in conformity with 
the constitutional traditions in EU member states. The disagreement on economic liberties reflects, 
inter alia, the tradition in many common law countries of protecting freedom of contract, freedom of 
profession and other economic freedoms as common law guarantees rather than as constitutional and 
human rights, and of conceiving democracy in terms of ‘parliamentary freedom’ rather than equal 
constitutional rights of citizens. The related disagreement on HRL and on its multilevel 
implementation in IEL may justify claims for ‘additional human rights’  - like ‘freedoms of the 
internet’ and the ‘right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential 
for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’, as recognized in UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/64/L.63 of 28 July 2010 as well as in Resolution A/HRC/Res/15/9 of 30 September 2010 of the UN 
Human Rights Council (deriving this right from ‘the right to an adequate standard of living’).  
Protection of human rights by UN bodies and ‘courts of justice’ delegitimizes authoritarian claims that 
governments (as ‘agents’ with limited powers) have not conceded such rights to their citizens (as the 
‘democratic principals’ of national and international law in the 21st century). Human rights advocates 
increasingly claim that, from a human rights perspective, IEL should be conceived as an instrument 
for protecting, respecting and fulfilling human rights. Comparative legal and institutional research 
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 See UN Resolution 63/116 on the 60th Anniversary of the UDHR adopted on 10 December 2008.  
18
 On the moral foundations of HRL and their impact on legal methodology see : E.U.Petersmann, Human Rights 
and International Economic Law, in : J.Linarelli (ed), Research Handbook on Global Justice and 
International Economic Law (to be published in 2012), chapter 2. 
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suggests that – just as the effectiveness of democratic self-government and of regional human rights 
conventions depends on constitutional and judicial protection of human rights – constitutional and 
judicial protection of ‘cosmopolitan conceptions’ of IEL (e.g. in transnational commercial and 
investment law, European economic integration law) empowering citizens to challenge and influence 
‘public reason’ has proven to be more effective and more legitimate than state-centred ‘Westphalian 
conceptions’ of IEL treating citizens as mere objects of intergovernmental regulation.19 
                                                     
19
 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century. Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel 
Governance of Interdependent Public Goods (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
8 
IV. ‘Constitutional Justice’ and the Changing Nature of the ‘Rules of Recognition’ in 
HRL and IEL 
Legal positivists tend to define ‘law’ not only by ‘primary rules of conduct’ but also by legal practices 
recognizing, developing and enforcing rules in conformity with ‘secondary rules’ of recognition, 
change and adjudication. The universal recognition of inalienable human rights by all UN member 
states has contributed also to the universal recognition of ‘principles of justice’ (e.g. in the UN 
Charter, human rights conventions and national constitutions) as integral parts of national and 
international legal systems. The ancient symbol of the independent, impartial judge administering 
justice by ‘weighing’ the arguments of both sides (justitia holding the scales) and enforcing the 
existing law (justitia holding the sword), like the common linguistic core of the legal terms jus, judex 
and justitia (or justice and the designation of judges as Lord Justice), recall much older traditions of 
recognizing justice as the main objective of law. Arguably, the legitimacy of law, governance and 
adjudication derives from ‘constitutional justice’ (e.g. as illustrated by the ancient Virtue of Justice 
protecting procedural human rights, modern theories of constitutional justice and ‘public reason’) no 
less than from ‘democracy’ (e.g. as illustrated by the historical transformation of ‘Renaissance rites of 
judgment’ into democratic and human rights of ‘access to justice’ requiring governments to protect 
judicial independence and transparency of courts and of their ‘due process of law’). J.Rawls’ theories 
of justice and of ‘public reason’ explain why – in constitutional democracies with constitutional 
adjudication – courts of justice may be more principled ‘exemplars of public reason’ than political 
institutions based on majority decisions dominated by organized interest groups. Hence, many lawyers 
and judges define law by ‘the prophecies of what courts will do in fact’ (US Supreme Court justice 
O.W.Holmes) and by how courts of justice will apply legal rules (e.g. ‘general principles of law’ in 
terms of Article 38 ICJ Statute). Economic courts in Europe20 as well as in LDCs21, and also investor-
state arbitral awards22, increasingly recognize that rules (including IEL) violating human rights may 
not be a valid part of positive law. As human rights law recognizes (e.g. in the UDHR) the need for 
limiting ‘rule by law’ through ‘rule of law’, the human right of ‘access to justice’ and judicial 
protection of ‘rule of law’ are of constitutional importance for both HRL and IEL. 
The constitutional guarantees of democratic participation, individual ‘access to justice’ and judicial 
protection of ‘rule of law’ enable citizens, their democratic representatives and ‘courts of justice’ to 
increasingly challenge power-oriented, intergovernmental economic regulation, even in case of EU 
regulations implementing legally binding sanctions approved by the UN Security Council.23 Arguably, 
the emerging ‘multilevel human rights constitution’ changes the ‘rules of recognition’ of international 
law by constitutionally limiting ‘Westphalian monopolies’ of diplomats to interpret and define the 
scope of international rules, ‘general principles of law’ and human rights.  HRL may justify legal 
                                                     
20
 In Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi, ECR 2008 I-6351, the EU Court confirmed its jurisprudence that 
respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness of EU measures: ‘the obligations imposed by an 
international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, 
which include the principle that the Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect 
constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to review.’ Even though ‘the European 
Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers’, including ‘observance of the 
undertakings given in the context of the United Nations’, it is ‘not a consequence of the principles governing 
the international legal order under the United Nations that any judicial review of the internal lawfulness of 
the contested regulation in the light of fundamental freedoms is excluded.’ 
21
 Cf. V.Gauri/D.M.Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice. Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights 
in the Developing World (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). 
22
 Cf., e.g., Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, ICSID Arbitration Award of 15 April 2009 (Case No 
ARB/06/5), para. 78 (finding that investment protection ‘should not be granted to investments made in 
violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights’). 
23
 Cf. Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi (note 20). 
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claims that human rights (e.g. of access to water and essential medicines) universally recognized in 
UN Resolutions may be relevant context for interpreting IEL ‘in conformity with principles of justice’. 
Also in less-developed countries (e.g. LDCs like India and South-Africa), ‘courts of justice’ – as the 
most independent guardians of the constitutional rights of citizens which, unlike political bodies, have 
to justify judicial decisions on the basis of constitutional principles – increasingly insist on their 
‘constitutional mandate’ of interpreting and applying economic law in conformity with human rights 
so as to protect citizens against abuses of public and private power.24 The ‘changing structures’ of 
human rights law, transnational commercial, trade, investment law and European economic integration 
law are illustrated by the fact that multilevel judicial interpretation and clarification of rules through 
thousands of dispute settlement findings by national and international courts and other dispute 
settlement bodies have become no less important for the progressive development of law and 
protection of individual rights than intergovernmental agreements. 
                                                     
24
 See Gauri/Brinks (note 21) and E.U. Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
"Constitutional Justice" (2008) 19 EJIL 769-798. 
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V. Legal and ‘Judicial Balancing’ as the ‘Ultimate Rule of Law’ (Beatty) 
Law as an instrument of governance needs justification.  Economists tend to justify economic rules in 
terms of promoting economic efficiency, ‘individual utility’, consumer welfare or ‘total welfare’. Yet, 
mere promotion of ‘market equilibrium’ through supply and demand, or ‘price-setting’ by monopolist 
suppliers (e.g. of tap water and patented medicines), may be inconsistent with human rights and 
corresponding government obligations to fulfil basic needs of everybody (e.g. in terms of human rights 
of access to water, food and essential medicines at affordable prices). Utilitarian focus on ‘output 
legitimacy’ cannot avoid questions of ‘input legitimacy’, for example regarding the frequent 
‘producer-bias’ in IEL resulting from rent-seeking ‘interest group politics’, inadequate regulation of 
‘market failures’ and  ‘private-public partnerships’ favouring special producer interests over general 
consumer welfare.  Similarly, positivist legal claims justifying ‘rule of men’ and their ‘rule by law’ by 
their social efficacy (based on authoritative issuance of rules) continue being challenged, since 
antiquity, by invoking ‘principles of justice’ as legal conditions of the legitimacy and validity of rules 
and of ‘rule of law’. ‘Conservative’ conceptions of justice emphasize the need for rule-following 
(path-dependence) and upholding ‘legality’; ‘reformative’ conceptions of justice acknowledge the 
additional function of law and ‘courts of justice’ to ensure ‘equity’ with due regard to the particular 
circumstances of disputes and the inevitably ‘incomplete nature’ of rule-making. Hence, there are 
longstanding traditions of complementing universal conceptions of ‘formal justice’ (e.g. as defined by 
equal human rights and ‘sovereign equality of states’) by particular conceptions of ‘substantive 
justice’ (e.g. in terms of ‘equity’ and ‘difference principles’ justifying rectification of formally equal 
treatment so as to ‘render to every man his due’). As long as constitutional and legal protection of 
economic and social rights remains so weak in so many countries (notably outside Europe), effective 
protection of ‘freedom from poverty’25 and of transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens 
requires overcoming the utilitarian and mercantilist traditions of separating HRL and IEL. 
Constitutional theory explains why national and intergovernmental power politics in IEL can be 
‘constitutionalized’ most effectively by legal and judicial protection of ‘countervailing rights’ 
protecting general consumer welfare, non-discriminatory conditions of competition, human rights and 
other reasonable long-term self-interests of all citizens.    
Similar to Article 1 of the UN Charter, customary law prescribes that ‘disputes concerning treaties, 
like other international disputes, should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law’ (Preamble VCLT). The Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organization, like many other international economic treaties, recognizes ‘basic principles and 
objectives […] underlying this multilateral trading system’ (cf. the Preamble of the WTO Agreement). 
Some of these principles are specified in WTO provisions, for instance in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other WTO agreements on trade in goods, services and trade-related 
intellectual property rights. Other principles are incorporated into WTO law by reference to other 
international law rules, for example in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which 
requires interpreting WTO law ‘in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law’ (Article 3). These customary rules include rules and principles for textual, 
contextual and teleological interpretation of treaties aimed at mutually coherent interpretations on the 
basis of legal presumptions of lawful conduct of states, of the systemic character of international law, 
and the mutual coherence of international rules and principles. Arguably, the customary law 
requirement of interpreting treaties ‘in conformity with principles of justice’, including ‘universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (Preamble VCLT), 
also calls for ‘constitutional interpretation’ clarifying the procedural as well as substantive principles 
of justice underlying IEL, like ‘due process of law’ based on equal treatment, freedom, non-
                                                     
25
 Cf. T. Pogge, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to Whom? (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
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discrimination, rule of law, independent third-party adjudication and preferential treatment of LDCs. 
For, rules and adjudication that are not perceived as just by governments, citizens and ‘courts of 
justice’, are unlikely to be effective over time.26  
Hence, IEL must not only be justified and evaluated in terms of ‘justice’ and human rights even if 
human rights are not specifically incorporated into the law of worldwide economic organizations. 
Legal and judicial interpretation of WTO rules in conformity with human rights, similar to the 1994 
Ministerial Decision on the mutual coherence of trade and environmental policies and the 1996 WTO 
Ministerial Declaration rejecting ‘the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes’ and calling 
for cooperation with the International Labour Organization as ‘the competent body to set and deal with 
[labour] standards’, may also be more appropriate for promoting legal coherence among IEL and HRL 
in worldwide governance institutions than incorporating UN human rights obligations into WTO law 
following the model of the incorporation of intellectual property treaty obligations into the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).27 The need for reconciling civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural human rights, like the need for reconciling legal market access 
commitments (e.g. under GATT and GATS) with sovereign rights to protect non-economic public 
interests (e.g. pursuant to Articles XIX-XXI GATT, XIV GATS), requires legal and judicial 
‘balancing’ so as to ‘optimize’ legal and judicial protection of competing rights and obligations. 
 Outside Europe, most governments continue to disregard that – due to the ‘globalization’ of ever 
more public goods like rule of law, protection of human rights and efficient trade, financial and 
environment protection systems – national constitutions have become ‘partial constitutions’ that can 
protect interdependent public goods only in cooperation with international law and institutions. The 
necessary ‘de-mystification of the state’ and international limitation of welfare-reducing ‘legal 
nationalism’ require new cosmopolitan and constitutional conceptions of international law as an ever 
more indispensable instrument for limiting governance failures at home and abroad for the benefit of 
citizens. As in European economic and legal integration, independent and impartial ‘courts of justice’, 
and their multilevel judicial protection of constitutional and human rights across frontiers on the basis 
of ‘judicial comity’ and ‘proportionality balancing’ as the ‘ultimate rule of law’28, must often take the 
lead in protecting citizens and their human rights in the worldwide division of labour among citizens. 
While judicial review of whether a restriction is 'suitable' and 'necessary' for realizing specific public 
policy interests focuses on the rationality and efficiency between the means and the end, the 
proportionality stricto sensu test reviews the reasonableness of the governmental balancing of 
competing values. Influenced by the comparatively narrower scope of constitutional protection of 
liberty rights (notably economic liberties) in Anglo-Saxon democracies, many Anglo-Saxon lawyers 
(like R. Dworkin) claim that - in 'hard cases' involving conflicts between constitutional rights and 
other public interests – individual rights should 'trump' public policies29; 'proportionality balancing' by 
European courts, by contrast, tends to perceive constitutional rights and public policies as possibly 
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 Cf. E.U. Petersmann, Constitutional Theories of International Economic Adjudication and Investor-State 
Arbitration, in: P.M.Dupuy/F.Francioni/ E.U.Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment 
Law and Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 137-194. 
27
 Cf. C. Thomas, The WTO and labor rights: strategies of linkage, in: Joseph/Kinley/Waincymer (note 9), 257 
ff.  
28
 According to D.M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), the constitutional ideal of a 
'government by law and not by men' has become replaced in European constitutional law (e.g. governing the 
EU, the EEA, the ECHR and the domestic implementation of these treaty regimes) by judicial proportionality 
review – commonly broken down into three distinct tests of 'suitability' (rationality), 'necessity' (least 
restrictive means) and 'proportionality stricto sensu’ (reasonableness) of the legality of legislative and 
administrative restrictions – securing a more substantial version of the rule of law for the benefit of citizens 
and their constitutional rights. 
29
 On the higher levels of constitutional and judicial protection of ‘negative’ and ‘positive liberties’ in European 
constitutional and economic law compared with Anglo-Saxon common law and constitutional law traditions 
see Petersmann (note 19), chapter II, sections 11 and 12.   
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both reflecting constitutional principles subject to weighting in order to promote their mutual 
coherence case-by-case. By double-checking legislative and administrative 'balancing' and clarifying 
'public reason' and ‘principles of justice’, judicial proportionality review of restrictions of fundamental 
rights contributes to 'participatory' and 'deliberative democracy' across frontiers as a necessary 
compensation of the deficits of national parliamentary democracy and other forms of majority politics 
in a globally integrating world. Human rights and their multilevel judicial protection are of crucial 
importance also in IEL for protecting citizens - as the ‘democratic principals’-  against abuses of 
power by government agents and corporations in multilevel economic regulation undermining, all too 
often, general consumer welfare and constitutional rights of citizens. 
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VI. Respect for ‘Margins of Appreciation’ and for ‘Reasonable Disagreements’ on 
the Optimal ‘Level of Regulation’ 
Human rights and democracy also protect individual and democratic diversity and ‘reasonable 
disagreement’ reflecting legitimately diverse democratic preferences (e.g. on the ‘politically optimal 
level of legal regulation’). International human rights conventions recognize that human rights ‘shall 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.30 Hence, human rights courts and also economic 
courts tend to recognize governmental ‘margins of appreciation’ concerning domestic implementation 
and legitimate ‘balancing’ of human rights obligations and fundamental freedoms. Intergovernmental 
recognition by UN bodies of ‘derived human rights’, like the diverse legal methods of protecting the 
human right to water inside national legal systems by means of constitutional, legislative, 
administrative and/or judicial rights (often derived from diverse human rights like the rights to life, 
health and/or an adequate standard of living)31, may be protected by such legitimate ‘margins of 
appreciation’ regarding optimal legal design and protection of human rights. Depending on the 
respective ‘constitutional context’ (e.g. the constitutional provisions on judicial review), ‘legislative’ 
and ‘judicial interpretations’ and legal clarifications may lead to ‘institutionalized public dialogues’ 
progressively developing ‘public reason’ supported by citizens. For instance: 
• The adoption by the UN Human Rights Committee in July 2011 of ‘General Comment No. 34’ 
on Article 19 ICCPR (freedom of opinion and expression) replaces the previous ‘General 
Comment No 10’ and considerably extends the ‘obligation to respect freedoms of opinion and 
expression (as) binding on every State party as a whole’ and on ‘(a)ll branches of the State 
(executive, legislative and judicial) and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever 
level’, e.g. by clarifying the scope of freedom of opinion and expression (e.g. by explicitly 
including commercial advertising and ‘all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and 
internet-based modes of expression’, protecting a ‘right of access to information held by public 
bodies’) and by limiting their admissible restrictions (e.g. by permitting only content-specific 
restrictions of, and prohibiting ‘generic bans’ on, the operation of certain websites and internet-
based information dissemination systems).32 
• Economic courts and dispute settlement bodies confronting disputes over market access 
commitments for the electronic supply of services (e.g. in the WTO disputes over US-Gambling 
restrictions and China-Restrictions on publications and audiovisual products) and over 
sovereign rights to protect ‘public morals’ and ‘public order’ (e.g. pursuant to Articles VI, XIV 
GATS) may have to decide whether, and to what extent, human rights, and their ‘dynamic 
interpretations’ by human rights bodies, may be ‘relevant context’ for interpreting economic 
rules (e.g. on market freedoms and related ‘commercial freedom of expression’).33 Yet, they may 
also have to respect that the state parties to a dispute – as in the China-Restrictions on 
audiovisual products case – may deliberately refrain from invoking human rights and from 
contesting China’s right to engage in ‘content control’ of internet services. 
                                                     
30
 Cf. Article 9 ECHR. For different limitation clauses see, e.g., Articles 8, 10 or 11 ECHR. Some human rights 
guarantees (like the prohibition of torture in Article 3 ECHR) do not provide for any governmental limitation. 
31
 Cf.: P.Thielbörger, The Right(s) to Water, EUI doctoral thesis defended in December 2010 (Florence: 
European University Institute, 2011). 
32
 Cf. UN document CCPR/C/GC/34 of 21 July 2011. 
33
 On these WTO disputes, and the deliberate abstention by the parties to the dispute as well as by WTO judges 
from refering to human rights, see: P.Delimatsis, Protecting Public Morals in a digital Age : Revisiting Public 
Morals in a Digital Age: Revisiting the WTO Rulings on US-Gambling and China-Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, in : JIEL 14 (2011), 257-293.   
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• WTO dispute settlement bodies have so far hardly ever referred to human rights in view of the 
usual abstention of WTO complainants and defendants to invoke human rights in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. Yet, the various studies by the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the consistency of international trade and investment law with human rights34 - like the 
ever larger number of academic case-studies on the human rights dimensions of IEL35 - have so 
far produced no evidence for inherent conflicts between worldwide economic treaties and HRL. 
As international treaties must be interpreted and applied in conformity with the human rights 
obligations of states, state practice and dispute settlement practices continue to progressively 
clarify the often controversial human rights dimensions of IEL, often without specifically 
referring to human rights. For instance, in the EC-Tariff Preferences dispute, the WTO Panel 
interpreted the non-discrimination requirement in the WTO’s Enabling Clause as requiring that 
identical tariff preferences under Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) be provided to all 
LDCs without differentiation; the Appellate Body reversed this finding and concluded that ‘the 
term “non-discriminatory” … does not prohibit developed-country Members from granting 
different tariffs to products originating in different GSP beneficiaries, provided that such 
differential tariff treatment meets the remaining conditions in the Enabling Clause. In granting 
such differential treatment, however, preference-granting countries are required, by virtue of the 
term ‘non-discriminatory’, to ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated 
GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP beneficiaries that have the ‘development, financial and 
trade needs’ to which the treatment in question is intended to respond.’36 In response to the 
various disputes over compulsory licensing of medicines, WTO Members adopted a ‘waiver’ in 
August 2003, as well as a subsequent amendment of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement, 
authorizing compulsory licensing of medicines for export to countries with insufficient or no 
production capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. Yet, the fact that Canada’s license for exports 
to Rwanda has remained the single compulsory license to date and only Zambia among Sub-
Saharan African countries ratified the TRIPS Amendment, support the view that access to 
essential medicines may be secured also by interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in conformity 
with the human rights obligations of WTO Members.37 
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 Cf. J. Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the WTO (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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 Cf. T.Cottier/J.Pauwelyn/E.Bürgi (eds), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: OUP, 2005); 
F.Abbott/C.Breining-Kaufmann/T.Cottier, International Trade and Human Rights (Ann Arbor: Michigan 
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 WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 173 (adopted April 2004). The argument that the EC’s ‘drug preferences’ were 
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not reviewed by the WTO dispute settlement bodies in terms of human rights.  
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 Cf. H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO. The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (Oxford: 
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VII. Increasing Insistence on the ‘Indivisibility’ of Human Rights 
The indivisibility of human dignity and human liberty is recognized in numerous human rights 
instruments like the 1993 Vienna Declaration adopted by the UN World Conference on Human 
Rights: ‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.38 Even 
though some UN human rights conventions separate civil and political human rights (as protected in 
the ICCPR) from economic and social human rights (as protected in the separate ICESCR), the holistic 
conception of the ‘indivisibility’ of human rights continues to be acknowledged in numerous human 
rights instruments since its first affirmation in the UDHR of 1948.39 The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has acknowledged that respect for human rights – including a ‘human right to respect of human 
dignity’ - is a condition of the lawfulness of acts of the EU institutions, even if EU acts implement UN 
Security Council decisions that assert legal primacy (Article 103 UN Charter).40 The European Court 
of Human Rights has likewise recognized in a series of judgments that the human rights guarantees of 
the ECHR also apply whenever states implement intergovernmental rules adopted in international 
organizations.41 Such court judgments confirm the increasing recognition that national and 
international human rights also limit foreign policy powers even if they are being exercised 
collectively in intergovernmental organizations. 
Disagreements over the ‘indivisibility’ of human rights often reflect diverse conceptions of human and 
constitutional rights to liberty. For instance, Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions tend to interpret the human 
right to liberty (Article 3 UDHR) narrowly in terms of freedom of bodily movement. European 
constitutional democracies often protect equal freedoms as ‘first principle of justice’ (in terms of 
Kantian and Rawlsian legal philosophy) not only through specific liberty rights, but also through a 
general constitutional right to liberty (as recognized in Article 2:1 of the German Basic Law) in order 
to offer additional constitutional and judicial protection to the legal autonomy of citizens against 
arbitrary, public and private interference into their liberties. This includes also protection against 
restriction of individual freedom of action resulting from multilevel governance, for instance if 
intergovernmental restrictions adopted in distant international organizations lack a constitutional 
foundation or sufficient justification in the national legal system.42 The multilevel constitutional 
guarantees of ‘free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, and freedom of establishment’ 
as ‘fundamental freedoms’ across the 30 member countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) are 
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 Paragraph 5 of the Declaration, reproduced in: The UN and Human Rights 1945-1995 (UN: New York, 1995), 
at 450. 
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 See, e.g., note 17 above and the ‘integrated’ protection of civil, political, economic and social rights in the 
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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 See note 20 above. 
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 See Case Bosphorus v Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, ECtHR Grand chamber judgment of 30 June 2005: 
‘a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs 
regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity 
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 On constitutional protection in Germany of a general right to liberty, complemented by specific constitutional 
liberty rights and other civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, see R.Alexy, A Theory of 
Fundamental Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2002), notably chapter 7.  
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explicitly based on 'the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights' (cf. Article 2 TEU). There is also increasing recognition that 
constitutional commitment to respect for human dignity and ‘market freedoms’ (e.g. free movement of 
workers and their families) may require legal protection of ‘positive liberties’ by means of social 
rights (e.g. to education, health protection, etc) in order to effectively empower individuals to develop 
their ‘human capacities’ autonomously.43 The diversity of provisions and institutional safeguards for 
social rights in national and regional laws, UN and ILO conventions reflects not only diverse legal 
conceptions for designing social rights as ‘indivisible parts’ of human rights. Constitutional agreement 
on how to reconcile and ‘institutionalize’ civil, political, economic and social rights is also inevitably 
influenced by democratic preferences and the scarcity of resources for effective protection of social 
rights. Legal and judicial remedies for enforcing civil, political, economic and social rights continue to 
differ enormously among countries and jurisdictions. Constitutional and judicial protection of a 
general right to liberty and of ‘common market freedoms’ can strengthen the reasonableness of IEL, 
for instance by offering judicial review of the ‘necessity’ (rationality) and ‘proportionality’ 
(reasonableness) of governmental restrictions on the basis of equal constitutional rights and judicial 
‘administration of justice.’ 
In common law countries, by contrast, the common law tends to protect specific liberties without 
constitutional protection of a general right to liberty.44 As a major function of constitutional guarantees 
of maximum equal freedoms is to protect rights to justification and to judicial remedies vis-à-vis 
governmental restrictions, judicial review of economic regulation tends to be less comprehensive in 
common law countries than in European economic law. For instance, since the judicial abandonment 
of ‘substantive due process’ review of economic legislation in the 1930s, US constitutional law 
protects individual economic freedom and a common market mainly by democratic legislation based 
on constitutional requirements of a ‘rational basis’ for governmental restrictions of economic liberty.45 
Since US courts do not protect economic and social freedoms (e.g. of workers and trade unions) as 
constitutionally protected under US federal law and acknowledge deference vis-à-vis economic 
legislation by the US Congress, most lawyers see no need for US courts to engage in the kind of ‘strict 
judicial scrutiny’ of governmental restrictions of economic freedom as it is practiced by German 
courts, European courts, WTO dispute settlement bodies and investor-state arbitral tribunals. Even 
though national constitutional traditions legitimately differ from country to country, there are 
additional arguments for basing legal and judicial remedies in multilevel, transnational economic 
governance against abuses of powers on the cosmopolitan principle that multilevel governance 
restrictions of individual freedom require constitutional justification and judicial remedies. 
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VIII. Increasing Importance of ‘Third Generation’ Human Rights and ‘Duties to 
Protect’ for ‘International Public Goods’ 
The under-supply of ever more interdependent global ‘public goods’ – like monetary and financial 
stability, a liberal (i.e. liberty-based) worldwide trading system, transnational rule of law protecting 
human and cosmopolitan rights, prevention of climate change – reflects economic and political 
‘market failures’ as well as ‘governance failures’ at national and international levels; due to 
globalization, failures to protect national public goods (e.g. an efficient market economy and tax 
system in Greece) increasingly undermine also protection of related international public goods (like 
financial stability and rule of law in the Eurozone).46 The history and theory of constitutionalism 
suggests that – just as supply of national public goods necessary for protecting human rights depends 
on protection of constitutional rights limiting abuses of public and private power – supply of 
transnational public goods likewise depends on multilevel legal and judicial protection of 
cosmopolitan rights.47 Since the UDHR (e.g. its Article 28), individual civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural human rights are ever more complemented by collective human rights at national 
and international levels, such as rights to popular self-determination, the ‘right to development’, 
collective labour rights, and rights to democratic governance, transnational rule of law and protection 
of the environment. Such ‘third generation human rights’, similar to the recognition of ‘common 
concerns’ in multilateral environmental agreements’, may justify conceptions of ‘responsible 
sovereignty’ and ‘duties to protect’ common concerns beyond national jurisdictions, as in the example 
of the EU’s extension of its carbon-trading regime to the greenhouse gas emissions caused by foreign 
airlines on their flights to and from Europe. 
As explained above in Section II, multilevel abuses of public and private power (e.g. in the private 
banking, financial and public ‘sovereign debt’ crises since 2008) undermining the collective supply of 
public goods may be counteracted most effectively by stronger constitutional ‘checks and balances’ 
and ‘countervailing rights’ (e.g. under constitutional, competition, social and environmental law) 
empowering citizens, civil society institutions, courts of justice and independent supervisory bodies to 
challenge abuses of power, as illustrated by the successful ‘judicial transformation’ of European 
economic law for the benefit of citizens and their human rights. Promoting such ‘constitutional 
reforms’ of IEL requires understanding the interrelationships between multilevel governance and 
multilevel legal protection of interdependent national, regional and global public goods; for instance, 
the multilevel GATT/WTO guarantees of economic freedoms and non-discriminatory conditions of 
competition can serve ‘constitutional functions’ for protecting a mutually beneficial common market 
among the 27 EU/WTO member states as well as among the 4 Chinese customs territories of Hong 
Kong, Macao, the Peoples’ Republic of China and Taiwan. Just as the EU’s customs union (cf. Arts. 
30-32 TFEU) continues to be based on GATT/WTO rules and their multilevel constitutional 
protection inside the EU (e.g. the EU’s constitutional requirement of ‘strict observance of international 
law’ in Article 3 TEU), so do GATT/WTO rules promote progressive, peaceful ‘reunification’ of the 
four independent Chinese customs territories. Had China - rather than withdrawing from GATT in 
1949 - complied with GATT rules since its GATT membership in 1948, the impoverishment of 
hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens could have been avoided. 
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IX. Human Rights, ‘Public Reason’ and the Competing Conceptions of IEL: Need for 
Institutional Innovation 
This contribution has argued for additional cosmopolitan and ‘constitutional reforms’ of IEL based on 
the following five propositions:  
1. The prevailing conceptions outside Europe of ‘legal nationalism’ and ‘international law among 
sovereign states’ fail to protect human rights and other international public goods effectively in 
transnational relations; due to the overlapping nature of many interdependent public goods (like 
rule of law, an efficient trade and financial system, protection of the environment), they risk 
undermining the reasonable self-interests of citizens and states.  
2. The international governance failures are largely due to inadequate regulation of the ‘collective 
action problems’ in the multilevel governance of international public goods, such as the 
‘jurisdiction gap’, the ‘governance gap’, the ‘incentive gap’, the ‘participation gap’ and the 
‘rule of law gap’.48  
3. The ‘collective action problems’ differ among policy areas and require sector-specific, 
multilevel regulation avoiding the utopia of unitary ‘global governance’; for instance, citizen-
driven markets and environmental pollution require multilevel regulation and judicial 
protection of rights and responsibilities not only of states, but also of citizens, with due respect 
for the legitimate diversity of constitutional conceptions of how human rights must be protected 
in the worldwide division of labour.  
4. The competing conceptions of IEL as ‘international law among sovereign states’, ‘Global 
Administrative Law’, multilevel economic regulation (e.g. in NAFTA) and international 
‘conflicts law’ must be integrated into a more coherent, multilevel governance based on 
common constitutional ‘principles of justice’ (e.g. as defined by human rights and national 
constitutions) and multilevel constitutional restraints of multilevel governance protecting 
legitimately diverse constitutional rights of citizens.49 The needed ‘institutional innovation’ 
must be based on the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, e.g. by strengthening the involvement of 
national parliaments, courts and self-interested citizens in reviewing and enforcing international 
rules protecting human rights and public goods. The 2009 US Supreme Court finding in 
Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency that six key greenhouse gases (such as 
carbon dioxide) are ‘air pollutants’ endangering public health in terms of the US Clean Air Act, 
illustrates the potentially systemic, constitutional implications of citizen-oriented 
interpretations of economic and environmental rules for jurisdictional competences in 
collective protection of public goods (like public health and climate change prevention).50  
5. The inevitable ‘legal fragmentation’ among national and functionally limited, transnational 
legal regimes must be mitigated by multilevel legal and judicial cooperation in protecting 
transnational rule of law and cosmopolitan rights of citizens, as required also by the human 
rights obligations of all UN member states and the customary law requirement of interpreting 
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international treaties, and settling international disputes, ‘in conformity with principles of 
justice’ and the human rights obligations of governments.  
National and international courts continue to agree on only a few 'core elements' of human dignity51, 
like the requirements that (1) every human being possesses an intrinsic worth and moral entitlement to 
human rights, merely by being human; (2) this moral worth and entitlement must be recognized and 
respected by others; (3) also the state must be seen to exist for the sake of the individual human being, 
and not vice versa.  
Beyond these core elements, the transformation of moral principles of 'dignity' and human rights into 
positive law and cosmopolitan rights may legitimately vary among jurisdictions according to their 
respective traditions, resources and democratic preferences (e.g. on how to prioritize and protect legal 
rights under conditions of scarce resources). Arguably, just as European economic law is explicitly 
‘founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights’ (Article 2 TEU), so must worldwide IEL be interpreted and further 
developed in the 21st century in conformity with the legal obligations of all UN member states to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights, as explicitly required by the customary methods of treaty 
interpretation and emphasized by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The needed 
limitation of the ‘animal spirits’ and rational egoism of economic actors by means of institutionalizing 
‘public reason’ in the worldwide division of labour must be based on stronger constitutional, 
legislative, administrative and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights empowering self-interested 
citizens and ‘public-private partnerships’ to defend their rights vis-à-vis abuses of public and private 
power also in transnational economic cooperation. Even though human rights and constitutional 
principles say little about the optimal design of legal institutions (such as independent regulatory 
agencies), comparative institutional analysis suggests that rights-based ‘cosmopolitan regimes’ in 
transnational commercial, trade, investment and regional economic and environmental law have 
proven to be more effective and more legitimate than state-centred ‘Westphalian regimes’ (cf. Table 
1). Yet, as illustrated by the current banking, financial and ‘sovereign debt’ crises in the EU and the 
USA, limitation of ‘market failures’ as well as of ‘governance failures’ remains a perennial task in 
IEL. Even though national governance systems will continue to legitimately differ depending on the 
respective constitutional traditions of people, protecting international public goods requires ‘bottom-
up strengthening’ of constitutional and cosmopolitan safeguards of constitutional and cosmopolitan 
rights of citizens and their democratic representatives against abuses of intergovernmental 
‘Westphalian governance’ and against the rational egoism by selfish private economic actors. 
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Table 1: From ‘Westphalian IEL’ to Regionally or Functionally Limited ‘Cosmopolitan IEL’ 
 
Westphalian IEL 
 
focuses on reciprocal rights/obligations among ‘sovereign states’ and separation of 
international from national legal systems, usually (e.g. in UN law) without compulsory 
jurisdiction for peaceful settlement of disputes; the treatment of citizens as mere objects, 
the lack of effective protection of ‘transnational rule of law’ and of human rights, and 
ineffective  parliamentary and democratic control of UN law in many states undermine the 
moral and democratic legitimacy of ‘Westphalian international law’. 
 
Cosmopolitan IEL focuses on rights and obligations of individuals and their multilevel legal and judicial 
protection across national frontiers (e.g. in transnational investment law); it protects 
transnational rule of law and strengthens the ‘constitutional  limits’ of state sovereignty, 
popular sovereignty and ‘constitutional justice’, for instance in regional EU law, EEA law 
and the ECHR. 
 
EU law integrates international and national, legal and judicial guarantees of  common market 
freedoms, transnational rule of law, human rights and other cosmopolitan rights on the 
basis of multilevel constitutional principles (e.g. of legal primacy, direct effect and direct 
applicability of EU legal rules) and EU institutions. 
 
EEA law integrates international and national, legal and judicial guarantees of Common market 
freedoms, transnational rule of law, human rights and other cosmopolitan rights on the 
basis of more deferential constitutional principles (e.g. of quasi-primacy and quasi-‘direct 
applicability’ of EEA rules after their incorporation into domestic law) and EEA 
institutions. 
 
ECHR law has evolved into a multilevel legal and judicial system protecting human  rights and access 
to justice in the legal and judicial systems of the 47 member states for the benefit of more 
than 800 million citizens. 
 
Law merchant 
(lex mercatoria) 
continues to evolve into cosmopolitan commercial, investment and arbitration law with 
multilevel judicial protection of individual freedoms (e.g. of contract), property rights and 
transnational rule of law empowering citizens. 
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X. Multilevel HRL and IEL Must be Coordinated through Multilevel 
‘Constitutional Bottom-Up Pluralism’  
The failures of the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO since 2001, like the failures of the UN 
negotiations on a new ‘Kyoto II Climate Change Agreement’ and the inadequate remedies in many 
UN human rights conventions, illustrate that ‘waiting for global consensus’ on protecting global public 
goods (like a liberal trading system, prevention of climate change, human rights) is an unreasonable 
governance strategy; bilateral and regional agreements (e.g. on carbon emission reductions) and 
unilateral safeguard measures (such as border tax adjustments) are usually necessary ‘building blocks’ 
for worldwide consensus-building. Proposals for coordinating the hundreds of fragmented, 
international and national legal regimes by using the formal ‘conflict rules’ codified in the VCLT 
(such as lex specialis, lex posterior, lex superior) are based on ‘Westphalian principles’ (like 
‘sovereign equality of states’) that may neglect effective protection of human rights, for instance if 
corrupt rulers abuse their ‘lending privilege’ and ‘resource privilege’ for appropriating and transferring 
wealth abroad to the detriment of domestic citizens. The diverse forms of European international law 
in the EU, the EEA and ECHR illustrate how – by interpreting state sovereignty, popular sovereignty 
and ‘individual sovereignty’ in mutually coherent ways, extending ‘public goods regimes’ (like the EU 
carbon emission trading system) to ‘free-riders’ (e.g. foreign airlines flying to the EU) based on 
principles of ‘common concerns’ to be protected by ‘responsible sovereignty’, and subjecting 
multilevel economic governance to multilevel constitutional restraints (e.g. by multilevel judicial 
protection of transnational rule of law) – IEL can be transformed ‘bottom-up’ into an instrument for 
promoting consumer welfare, rule of law and human rights across frontiers.52 ‘Constitutional 
pluralism’, as applied by national and international courts throughout Europe, argues that 
interdependent national and international legal regimes need to be interpreted in mutually coherent 
ways on the basis of ‘universalizable’ principles of justice and human rights; the plurality of 
legitimate, yet potentially conflicting claims based on diverse, national and international constitutional 
systems must be reconciled by legal and judicial ‘balancing’ of competing constitutional principles, 
human rights and ‘deliberative democracy’, especially in mutually beneficial cooperation among 
citizens across frontiers.  
Similar to the private and public, national and international regulation of international economic 
cooperation, human rights are regulated and protected at local, national and international levels. Like 
economic and social rights, human rights can be interpreted as fundamental freedoms protecting 
‘human capacities’ and legal autonomy. As UN HRL tends to prescribe only minimum standards of 
protection with due respect for national ‘margins of appreciation’ for regulating, prioritizing and 
mutually ‘balancing’ civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, human rights require 
respecting the legitimate ‘constitutional pluralism’ in multilevel protection of human rights and of 
international economic cooperation among citizens.  The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has argued for a ‘human rights approach’ to multilevel economic regulation so as to limit the often 
one-sided focus on producer interests by promoting synergies between economic regulation and 
human rights.53 The UNHCHR differentiates between obligations to respect human rights (e.g. by 
refraining from interfering in the enjoyment of such rights), to protect human rights (e.g. by preventing 
violations of such rights by third parties), and to fulfill human rights (e.g. by taking appropriate 
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legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such 
rights). As recourse to trade sanctions for promoting respect for human rights abroad can aggravate the 
problems of people adversely affected by trade sanctions, the UNHCHR reports emphasize both 
potential synergies as well as potential conflicts between human rights and economic rules in the 
context of trade liberalization, trade restrictions and other economic regulation. Arguably, modern 
HRL requires going beyond the prevailing ‘Rawlsian conception of international law among sovereign 
peoples’ and requires respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights also across frontiers as ‘the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ (Preamble UDHR).  
The Rawlsian argument – that it is ‘the fact that in a democratic regime political power is regarded as 
the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body’ which requires that the democratic exercise 
of coercive power over one another can be recognized as being democratically legitimate only when 
‘political power […] is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials 
of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human 
reason’54 – applies also to multilevel regulation of mutually beneficial  economic cooperation among 
citizens in the worldwide division of labour. The less national parliaments control intergovernmental 
rulemaking, the more must the deficit in parliamentary and deliberative democracy be compensated by 
rights-based constitutionalism and multilevel judicial protection of constitutional rights and 
‘participatory democracy’ across frontiers. As explained by Rawls, ‘in a constitutional regime with 
judicial review, public reason is the reason of its supreme court’; transparent, rules-based and impartial 
judicial reasoning, subject to procedural guarantees of due process of law, makes independent courts 
less politicized ‘fora of principle’ that are of constitutional importance for an ‘overlapping, 
constitutional consensus’ necessary for legally stable and just relations among free, equal and rational 
citizens who tend to remain deeply divided by conflicting moral, religious and philosophical doctrines.  
Just as the EU Courts, the European Court of Human Rights, the EFTA Court and national courts have 
successfully transformed the international EC and EEA treaties and the ECHR into constitutional 
orders founded on respect for human rights, so can incremental ‘judicial constitutionalization’ of 
international trade, investment and environmental treaty regimes contribute to making IEL more 
consistent with HRL for the benefit of citizens. As explained by I. Kant’s theory of multilevel 
constitutional guarantees of equal freedoms (as ‘first principle of justice’) in all human interactions at 
national, transnational and international levels, multilevel constitutionalism is neither based on naïve 
assumptions about individuals’ moral capacities nor on utopian calls for a ‘global Constitution’; it is 
necessary for institutionalizing ‘public reason’ with due respect for the legitimate reality of 
‘constitutional pluralism’ so that - even in a ‘society of devils’ (I.Kant) - human interactions remain 
constitutionally restrained.55 The diverse forms of multilevel constitutionalism in the EU, the EEA and 
the ECHR, like the multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights in international commercial, 
trade, investment, regional integration and human rights law outside Europe, further illustrate that 
‘multilevel constitutionalism’ has become a politically feasible and realistic conception of 
‘constitutional justice’; it is no longer only a ‘cosmopolitan dream’. The legitimacy of ‘cosmopolitan 
IEL’ and of the necessary, additional ‘multilevel constitutional restraints’ of worldwide economic 
organizations derives from protecting human rights, other ‘principles of justice’ and national 
democracies’ promise of self-governance of citizens limited by rule of law. 
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XI. Lessons from International Investment Law for Cosmopolitan Reforms of IEL? 
Sections I to X have explained why effective protection of human rights calls for multilevel 
constitutional and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights so as to protect interdependent 
‘cosmopolitan public goods’ – like citizen-driven markets and trading systems aimed at promoting 
consumer welfare – more effectively in conformity with the ‘subsidiarity principle’, i.e. ‘as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizens’ (cf. Articles 1, 5 TEU). It was further shown that – 
in areas such as human rights law, EU law, EEA law, the ECHR and the transnational ‘law merchant’ 
– multilevel legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights has succeeded in limiting 
discriminatory abuses of foreign policy powers for the benefit of citizens (cf. Table 1). But how can 
‘Westphalian legal regimes’ focusing on reciprocal rights and obligations among sovereign states – 
like UN law, the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements, GATT 1947, the WTO Agreement and multilateral 
environmental agreements among states – be transformed into cosmopolitan legal regimes focusing on 
protection of human rights and other cosmopolitan rights of citizens as ‘democratic principals’ of 
governments as ‘agents’ with limited, delegated powers? Section XI asks whether the dynamic 
transformation of international investment law into a ‘cosmopolitan legal system’ based on multilevel 
legal protection of investor rights offers lessons for future ‘cosmopolitan IEL’. Section XII concludes 
with a brief look at the emergence of European economic law and its lessons for IEL beyond Europe. 
Until the judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the ELSI dispute56, most international 
investment disputes were decided either by recourse to domestic courts or by diplomatic protection of 
the foreign investor by the home state which, occasionally, submitted the dispute to international 
courts like the ICJ or its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. Yet, as illustrated 
by the ELSI judgment delivered by the ICJ more than 20 years after the dispute between the US 
investor and the local authorities in Sicily arose, most foreign investors perceive the prior exhaustion 
of local remedies in national courts and ‘politicized’, lengthy procedures of diplomatic protection and 
disputes among states in international courts as offering inadequate legal and judicial safeguards of 
investor rights. The transformation of international investment law from a ‘Westphalian’ into a more 
‘cosmopolitan system’ evolved since the 1960s in essentially five phases: 
• Since the conclusion of the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany and Pakistan 
in 1959, the number of BITs has dynamically increased to now almost 3’000 agreements. Yet, 
the ‘first generation BITs’ did not yet provide for direct access of the foreign investor to 
independent international arbitration. 
• The 1965 World Bank Convention establishing the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which entered into force already in 1966 (following 20 
ratifications), offered a multilateral legal framework for institutionalized, transnational 
arbitration of investment disputes based on consent between the states and investors involved. 
The first ICSID disputes were based on investor-state contracts57 or on national legislation 
providing for direct access of foreign investors to international arbitration.58 
• Treaty-based investor-state arbitration was provided for only in the ‘second generation BITs’ 
concluded since about the 1970s; in view of its many advantages for private investors (e.g. in 
terms of direct access to independent international arbitration usually without prior exhaustion of 
local remedies, direct control of the procedures without dependence on ‘diplomatic protection’, 
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availability of institutionalized ICSID procedures), most modern BITs provide for treaty-based 
investor-state arbitration.59  
• In contrast to the less than 400 BITs concluded prior to 1989, the number of new BITs increased 
dramatically since the 1990s and approaches now 3’000 BITs or corresponding treaty provisions 
in free trade agreements (like NAFTA Chapter XI) and other sectorial agreements (like the 
Energy Charter Treaty which entered into force in 1998), including increasingly also BITs 
among LDCs.  
• Since the 1990s, also the number of treaty-based ICSID disputes, or investor-state disputes based 
on UNCITRAL or other commercial arbitration procedures, and the emergence of case-law 
referring to the today almost 400 known investor-state arbitral awards and related ‘annulment 
decisions’ or national court decisions as relevant precedents, increased dramatically. 
Does this revolutionary transformation of international investment law – within only a few decades – 
offer lessons for the normatively desirable, potential transformation of other fields of ‘IEL among 
sovereign states’ into a rights-based ‘cosmopolitan IEL’ for the benefit of citizens?60 Foreign direct 
investments offer obvious economic advantages (e.g. in terms of transfer of capital and know-how) to 
the host state justifying legal ‘investment incentives’ compensating for the less secure legal status and 
potential discrimination of foreigners in the domestic legal system of host states. The ‘political 
economy’ for the regulation of transnational movements of other natural and legal persons (like 
foreign workers, traders, portfolio investors, tourists, refugees) offers, unfortunately, less incentives 
for host states to commit to multilevel guarantees of cosmopolitan and judicial remedies in 
transnational legal systems. Even most regional human rights courts offer individual access only after 
prior exhaustion of local judicial remedies. With only few exceptions (like the ‘domain name dispute 
settlement system’ established in the context of the arbitration centre of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization), ‘cosmopolitan dispute settlement institutions’ similar to institutionalized 
ICSID arbitration and its quasi-automatic enforceability in domestic legal systems (e.g. due to the 
ICSID Convention and, in case of commercial arbitration, the 1958 New York Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) do not (yet) exist in most other fields of 
IEL. Nor are most UN member states politically willing to submit to compulsory international 
jurisdiction for the protection of other cosmopolitan rights of citizens. Yet, this current reluctance of 
states to limit their ‘Westphalian privileges’ (e.g. in terms of limited legal and judicial accountability 
vis-à-vis foreigners) by additional legal and judicial guarantees of cosmopolitan rights may change, for 
instance by the gradual recognition of individual legal and judicial remedies in international double 
taxation agreements and the ever larger number of multilevel legal and judicial safeguards of 
cosmopolitan rights in regional economic integration agreements and human rights agreements. 
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XII. Lessons from European Economic Law for Cosmopolitan Reforms of IEL? 
European economic integration law was most successful in those areas (like the common market) 
where EU citizens could directly invoke and judicially enforce EU rules (such as the common market 
and competition rules) against discriminatory restrictions by EU member states or EU institutions. The 
multilevel legal and judicial protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the 
500 million EU citizens as well as of citizens in other European states was often initiated and 
developed by multilevel judicial cooperation among national and European courts (like the ECJ, the 
EFTA Court, the European Court of Human Rights) before national governments and European 
political institutions accepted and supported the ‘direct applicability’ in domestic courts of 
international treaty guarantees for the benefit of citizens (e.g. the ‘market freedoms’ protected by the 
EC, EU and EEA treaties).61 In those areas where national and European courts did not exercise 
leadership in multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights, the political EU institutions often 
defended their political self-interests in avoiding legal and judicial accountability vis-à-vis EU citizens 
for non-compliance with the EU law requirements of ‘the rule of law’ (Article 2 TEU) and ‘strict 
observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU). For instance: 
• Even though many GATT and WTO legal and judicial guarantees of economic freedom, non-
discriminatory conditions of competition and rule of law are precise and unconditional enough 
for being construed as protecting corresponding freedoms and legal security of EU citizens in 
their transnational economic cooperation, the political EU institutions and governments have 
asserted ‘freedom of maneuver’62 - in the sense of ‘freedom to violate WTO law’ – without legal 
and judicial accountability vis-à-vis EU citizens adversely affected by the EU’s numerous 
violations of its WTO legal and dispute settlement obligations.63 
• The Intertanko judgment64 of the ECJ suggests that - contrary to the constitutional mandate of 
Article 21 TEU that the ‘Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world’, as convincingly defended in the Kadi-judgments65 - the 
EU Court has decided to grant legal and judicial immunity to violations by the EU also of its 
obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, without offering adversely affected 
EU citizens and EU member states effective judicial remedies.  
• In accordance with the EU Commission’s declared strategy for negotiating a ‘new generation’ of 
free trade agreements focusing on reciprocal trade liberalization66, the 2010 EU Council 
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Decision approving the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement explicitly states that the ‘Agreement 
shall not be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked 
before Union or Member State courts and tribunals’.67 As similar provisions are envisaged for 
the ‘new generation’ of EU free trade agreements (e.g. with Canada), the EU Court’s case-law 
excluding legal and judicial remedies of EU citizens against EU violations of WTO law is likely 
to be extended to all international trade agreements by the EU, thereby further undermining the 
EU law principles of ‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU), of judicial 
remedies ‘to ensure effective legal protection’ (Article 19 TEU, Article 47 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights), and of ‘consistent interpretation’ of EU law (e.g. of the ‘freedom to 
conduct a business in accordance with Union law’ as protected in Article 16 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights) in conformity with the international legal obligations of the EU.68 
• The EU Commission’s claim, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, to terminate 
the about 190 BITs concluded among EU member states – without offering investors equivalent 
legal and judicial remedies under EU law against governmental restrictions of their investor 
rights – continues to be resisted by many governments on the ground that these treaty-based 
safeguards of investor rights and judicial remedies complement and go beyond those of EU 
law.69 The ECJ has held arbitration to be consistent with EU law provided arbitral awards 
comply with EU law70; as investor-state arbitral awards tend to interpret BITs as protecting not 
only rights of states but also of investors71, the selfish tendency of the political EU institutions to 
curtail - rather than strengthen - individual economic rights and judicial remedies is politically 
regrettable and legally not justifiable.72   
Arguably, the ‘governance failures’ to protect international public goods – like mutually beneficial 
liberalization and regulation of international markets in the WTO and financial institutions, prevention 
of greenhouse gas emissions leading to climate change – are also largely due to nationalist ‘interest 
group politics’ in parliaments.73 European integration law increasingly limits ‘democratic majority 
politics’ by multilevel constitutional restraints for the benefit of EU citizens and their multilevel 
constitutional rights. Yet, the persistent violations of the EU treaty disciplines for national fiscal and 
debt policies (e.g. as prescribed in Article 126 TFEU and Protocol No.12 on the excessive deficit 
procedure) by most of the 17 Eurozone member states, and the inadequate supervision and protection 
of rule of law in the Eurozone by EU institutions and national parliaments, have entailed the so far 
biggest ‘rule of law crisis’ in the EU challenging the legitimacy of multilevel financial governance in 
the Eurozone. The new EU Regulations, Directives and treaties among Eurozone members aim at 
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strengthening fiscal, debt and economic governance74 through stronger EU ‘top-down surveillance’ 
based on complex reporting, consultation and supervision requirements. Yet, they do not change the 
basic existing constitutional principles underlying the Eurozone, including the EU’s ‘bail-out 
prohibitions’ (Articles 123-125 TFEU) based on the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ (Article 5 TEU) 
reserving for member states the primary responsibility for complying with the agreed monetary, fiscal, 
debt and financial disciplines, for granting ‘financial stability support’ (e.g. through the newly 
established ‘Financial Stability Mechanism’), and for promoting economic growth through ‘an open 
market economy with free competition’ (Articles 119-121 TFEU). As illustrated by the regular strikes 
and citizen protests in Greece, realizing the explicit aim of these EU Regulations to ensure ‘stronger 
national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies’ will ultimately depend on EU citizens 
assuming their democratic responsibilities (e.g. to ensure that national tax legislation in Greece is not 
systematically undermined by fraud and tax evasion) and insisting on stronger ‘democratic ownership’ 
of rule-of-law so as to prevent private and public debt defaults and other breaches of the law in 
Eurozone member states.  
Arguably, the current ‘rule of law crisis’ inside the Eurozone entails a broader historical lesson for the 
future of European integration: Without empowering EU citizens to hold national governments and 
EU institutions accountable for ‘rule of law and respect for human rights’ (Article 2 TEU), the EU 
risks losing not only its democratic legitimacy but also its rules-based capacity of stimulating the 
economic growth and peaceful adjustments necessary for financing the uniquely successful ‘European 
model’ of protecting cosmopolitan rights, democratic peace and social welfare for the benefit of 500 
million EU citizens. At national levels, the diverse traditions of constitutional democracy, majoritarian 
democracy, non-liberal democracies and authoritarian forms of governance are likely to continue in 
the 21st century. At the ever-more important transnational level of multilevel governance of 
interdependent public goods, however, protection of international public goods for the benefit of 
citizens requires multilevel constitutional restraints on national ‘majority politics’ and on rent-seeking 
interest group politics based on stronger constitutional rights of citizens, parliamentary supervision 
and judicial remedies against arbitrary violations of transnational rule of law. More effective 
protection of international public goods in the 21st century – like the realization of the ‘Durban 
agreement’ of December 2011 to conclude, by 2015, a legally binding worldwide agreement on 
climate change prevention with carbon-emission reduction commitments by developed and developing 
countries – requires more ‘cosmopolitan public reason’ based on ‘responsible sovereignty’ and ‘duties 
to protect’ internationally recognized public goods and ‘common concerns’ across frontiers for the 
benefit of citizens and their cosmopolitan rights. 
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in the domestic legal systems of Eurozone member states. 

  
 
